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Abstract:  The goal of this paper is to examine climate change through the lens of 
distributive justice. In doing so, it will attempt to answer how three important questions 
of distributive justice apply to climate change policy. These questions, what is the object 
of distribution, how should this object be distributed, and among whom should this 
distribution take place, will be the topics of the topics of the first, second, and third 
sections respectively. Through this examination, it is the hope of this paper that certain 
policy recommendations and climate change strategies can be developed which 
adequately take into account both the goods that contribute to the well-being or 
capabilities of people, as well as the negative impacts climate change has on them. It will 
be argued that when we view climate change in this way, it can be seen as a capability 
depriving force that limits development, and that climate change policies that focus on 
technology transfer and energy innovation are most equipped to deal with these 
problems.  
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Introduction: 
 Climate change is perhaps the most interesting and complex ethical issue that the 
world faces today. It is a problem that the vast majority of people have contributed to in 
some way, one that affects everyone and everything on the entire planet in varying 
degrees. It has political, ethical, economic, scientific, and technological facets. It has been 
correctly labeled “A Perfect Moral Storm”1 by Stephen Gardiner and is an issue that can 
be viewed in a myriad of ways. This paper will examine climate change from a 
distributive justice standpoint. The goal of looking at climate change in this way is to take 
a closer look at the distribution of harms, benefits, and responsibilities, and how these 
should influence international climate change policy. In doing so three questions of 
distributive justice will need to be answered: What is the object of distribution, how 
ought it best to be distributed, and finally among whom should this distribution take 
place, or to say it more simply, who should be the beneficiaries and benefactors of this 
distribution.   
Section 1 will argue for the appropriateness of such an approach to the climate 
change problem and proceed to look at the “what” question of distributive justice. Section 
1 will suggest that the object of distribution ought to be benefits from emissions. In doing 
so, it will show how fully accepting this as our object of distribution changes climate 
change policy. Section 2 will then examine how benefits from emissions can and should 
be distributed and will argue in favor of international technology transfer programs as 
being the most fitting approach. Finally, section 3 will look at among whom this 
distribution should take place. More specifically it will address who should pay for 
technology transfer programs, who should receive them, and why this is the case. It will 
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argue that developed nations who have most benefitted from emissions are not only the 
most capable of leading technology transfer programs, but that they have a moral 
responsibility to do so.  
The main goal of this paper is not to argue for very specific actions to take or 
principals to follow, but instead to show some of the benefits of viewing climate change 
as a distribution and poverty problem that affects capabilities and development. In 
framing the climate change problem this way, we may be able to identify areas where 
current climate change policy is lacking.   
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Section 1.0: The Appropriateness of Using Distributive Justice 
 The practice of distributive justice is usually called upon when there is a limited 
amount of some desired good that is spread out amongst a given population in a 
seemingly unjust or unfair way.  The appropriateness of using this type of thinking to 
examine climate change is made evident in Peter Singer’s essay “One Atmosphere.” Just 
as his title suggests, Singer argues that we all share one atmosphere. He compares the 
current situation of atmosphere pollution to a village where everyone puts their waste 
down a sinkhole. At first this hole seemed so large that some of the people in the village, 
who were better off, and had higher rates of consumption, used the sinkhole much more 
than others in the village. As time went on it became clear that this excessive usage of the 
sinkhole led to an overflow of waste. In addition to rendering the sinkhole full and no 
longer a valid site for waste, this overflow led to a foul odor and an increase in sickness 
in the town. Those who overused the sinkhole, without regard for the consequences of 
doing so, did not leave enough sinkhole space for other contemporary, or future, 
villagers. In this example the limited sinkhole space becomes a resource or good that 
needs to be monitored and distributed more evenly amongst the villagers. Some 
redistribution or control appears to be needed in order to preserve the health of the 
sinkhole and the health of the village.  
Singer here draws from Locke’s idea of leaving “enough and as good” resources 
for others.2 In Singer’s village example the villagers that are contributing more than their 
fair share of waste to the sink hole are leaving neither enough space for other current and 
future villagers, nor are they leaving behind a condition that could be classified as being 
“as good” as the one they experienced. Singer states, “For the sink belongs to us all in 
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common, we are depriving others of their right to use the sink in the same way without 
bringing about results none of us wants.”3 
As the effects of climate change have become more evident and as climate 
science continues to project the disastrous possibilities of the continued pollution of the 
atmosphere, it is clear that our one atmosphere is a limited resource that perhaps has 
already been used past its limit. As we pass carbon dioxide levels of 400 parts per 
million, which is over 100 parts per million more than the earth has experienced at any 
point in the last 400,000 years4, we are seeing noticeable effects this unprecedented 
increase is having on temperature, sea level, ocean acidification, more extreme weather 
events, and decreasing amounts of ice mass. This combined with the fact that certain 
groups of people are using up far more of this atmosphere than others, and that everyone 
will experience changes in their quality of life regardless of how much they have 
contributed to the shrinking of this resource, make climate change a ripe topic for 
distributive justice to examine. 
 There are many ways to go about examining climate change from this 
distributive justice standpoint. It is an unfortunate fact of climate change that the 
distribution of contributions to climate change and the distribution of experienced climate 
harms do not align. Those that contribute to the problem the most are not the ones who 
will be forced to face the extreme consequences of these actions. In fact, just the opposite 
seems true. As Dale Jamieson points out, it is the rich who are disproportionately using a 
global public good and it is the poor who will be disproportionately harmed.5 The 
distribution of present and future climate harms is such that many of the nations that do 
not contribute to climate change, such as those in the Alliance of Small Island States who 
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emit about 1 half of 1% of the global emissions6, will have to deal with the most extreme 
impacts and losses, such as sea level rise, drought, and more frequent extreme weather 
events.7 Examining the fairness and distribution of contributions and harms is one way 
distributive justice can help us unpack the climate change issue.  
Henry Shue utilizes another consideration of distributive justice when he asks 
questions such as what are fair allocations of the costs to prevent and cope with climate 
change effects, what background allocation of wealth would ensure that this international 
bargaining is a fair process, and finally what is a fair allocation of emissions of 
greenhouse gasses.8 Examining fair allocations and what background allocations ensure a 
fair process are key distributive justice issues. In applying this line of thinking to climate 
change, one could say that it is most fair to have those who have contributed to climate 
change the most pay for prevention and adaption efforts. Someone who supported such a 
view could argue that a country whose emissions have contributed greatly to the climate 
change problem, like the United States, ought to fund the relocation efforts of those in the 
Pacific Islands who will lose their homes at no fault of their own.  
This paper will primarily view climate change as a development limiting force 
that has arisen from an uneven distribution of contributions to climate change. In 
pursuing their own development goals, nations such as the United States have contributed 
greatly to the creation of current and future climate harms, which negatively influence the 
development options of lesser-developed nations.  To invoke Singer and Locke again, 
through uneven contributions to climate change, the developed nations have not left 
“enough and as good” development potential for the many struggling nations. It may now 
be against the best long-term interests of these undeveloped nations to pursue 
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development through carbon based energy sources. Although it may benefit these nations 
in the short-term, developing in this way could contribute to future extreme climate 
harms, and possibly the destruction of their entire way of life. Like the villager in 
Singer’s example who has an immediate desire to increase consumption, but is forced to 
worry about the future impacts this consumption could have on the health of his village, 
these nations have been unfairly dealt limited development options. This dichotomy of 
climate change policy and development planning needing to deal with short-term 
interests as well as long-term effects will be a constant consideration throughout this 
paper.  
In summary, an uneven distribution of development related goods, has led to an 
uneven distribution of climate related harms. Analyzing these two uneven distributions, 
examining what object of distribution can lead to the creation of these goods while not 
contributing to the harms, and discussing what sorts of changes in distribution or 
compensation for harms ought to happen, is the primary objective of this paper.  
 
Section 1.1: The Object of Distribution 
 Often discussion of distributive justice in climate change go immediately to the 
“how” and “among whom” questions. Singer also moves to this step after establishing the 
appropriateness of viewing climate change from a distributive justice standpoint. He 
discusses strategies such as implementing tradable carbon credits distributed based on 
population size, which would discourage a continued usage of fossil fuels in developed 
nations while giving those lesser-developed nations some bargaining chips. This and 
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other strategies make the reasonable assumption that emissions are the object of 
distribution. This is the assumption that I wish to contest here.  
There are two key considerations of distributive justice that we must keep in 
mind. The first deals with the distribution of goods and can be thought of as the positive 
consideration. In this positive aspect, there is an object of distribution that should be a 
good or resource that a certain population lacks. The object of distribution should be 
scarce, lacking, or limited in some sense, since obviously if it were unlimited, or easily 
accessible to all, there would be no need to distribute it. The object should be some 
resource or good since if it has no use or value it would not really matter if it were 
distributed in some unjust manner. Similarly, the object should be beneficial to or desired 
by those in the population it will be distributed among. If some portion of the population 
has no desire or use for the good in question, it would not make much sense to give it to 
them. Even though yachts are a limited good which may be desired by many, distributing 
all the yachts in the world evenly amongst the entire earth’s population would not be 
sensible since large portions of the population would have no water to use one on. There 
are certain objects of distribution that may not meet all of these positive criteria, but I will 
take those that do meet them to be the most suitable objects of distribution. 
 The second consideration of distributive justice deals with the distribution of 
harms and contributions to these harms, and can be thought of as the negative aspect of 
distributive justice. It is important to keep in mind the point mentioned earlier about the 
distribution of contributions to climate harms. It is often the goal of distributive justice to 
examine ways to limit the amount of harms one group can cause, how to distribute the 
cost of compensating for these harms, and even ways to distribute the harms that will 
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inevitably come. This again goes back to the “enough and as good” idea and will 
examined more fully in sections 2 and 3. We must not only be concerned with 
distributing goods and benefits but also with distributing and controlling climate harms, 
the ability to cause these harms, and with providing compensation for, and protection 
from, these harms.  
The next step then is to determine if emissions meet these criteria of what an 
object of distribution ought to be. While emissions were at one time not considered to be 
a limited resource, in that we can seemingly produce as much emissions as we please, it 
is clear that emissions should be capped or held to a limit for the sake of the planet and 
those inhabiting it. Allowable emissions are then, in a sense, limited.  
We could perhaps find it useful to draw on Henry Shue’s distinction of 
“subsistence emissions” and “luxury emissions.”9 After determining what a reasonable 
per capita emission cap should be, we could then define anything over this as being 
“luxury emissions” that could then be taxed or punished in some way. In this sense 
emissions do seem to satisfy the criterion of being limited. Emissions appear to be useful 
in that they lead to certain goods or benefits such as faster travel, refrigeration, air 
conditioning and heating, and entertainment. However, this connection is not as strong as 
it could be since each of these can be achieved in many ways that do not rely on carbon 
emissions, namely through alternative energy sources. Emissions appear to be necessary 
contributors to the harms we are concerned with distributing, but not necessary 
contributors to the benefits we are concerned with. Therefore it is unnecessary to view 
emissions as though they are, and always will be, a necessary element of our day-to-day 
lives that we need to figure out how to distribute justly. Emissions are not a resource that 
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leads to a good; instead they appear to be a harm that results from one way of creating 
some good.  
Going back to Singer’s village comparison, we can see that the waste in the 
village, like emissions, is a harm that results from pursuing some good. It is not a 
desirable resource, good in and of itself, that ought to be distributed. If the waste were 
redistributed so that every villager created an equal amount of waste, the problems in the 
village would still continue since the sinkhole is already overflowing with waste. Even 
so, the village may succeed in reducing and more evenly distributing the waste by 
establishing some excess waste tax or tradable waste credits. One of these may be the 
best strategy for the village since, presumably, the waste being created is a necessary 
byproduct of the villager’s daily life. 
Drawing again from Shue, we could distinguish between “subsistence waste” and 
“luxury waste.” The villagers will necessarily produce some waste just as a by-product of 
actions needed for survival. They should not be punished for this necessary waste, but 
perhaps some distribution strategy could be implemented to discourage the creation of 
any “luxury waste.” Since Singer says that some of the villagers consume much more 
than others, and thereby, produce more waste, there does seem to be a need to redistribute 
or redefine how much waste is acceptable for a villager to produce. Since the waste is a 
necessary byproduct, which means that there cannot really be any strategies that change 
the way of life of the villagers in order to produce a different type of waste, these types of 
distribution strategies may be the best course of action.  
Carbon emissions do not appear to be at the same level of necessary existence as 
the villager’s waste. Carbon emissions are not fundamentally necessary for sustenance, 
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and the vast majority of the ways we use carbon emissions for current sustenance could 
be obtained through the uses of other forms of energy. While current practices or 
technologies may make this improbable, it is in theory true that all the ways in which we 
currently use carbon to fuel our desires and needs could also be satisfied by some 
combination of wind, solar, nuclear, and other non-carbon based energy sources.  Just 
like in the village, the problems of climate change will continue even if we begin to 
distribute emissions more justly across the globe.  
This is not to say that emissions distribution is not an important piece of the 
climate change puzzle, as they aren’t completely going away any time soon. Emissions 
have played a crucial and necessary part in the creation of the climate change problem, so 
it makes sense to think they need to play a part in its resolution. It is important to both 
distribute the rights to emit equitably and to persuade certain countries to emit less or use 
less carbon intense energy sources. Methods like carbon trading and carbon taxing, which 
are emission focused approaches to climate change, may help in slowing, and perhaps 
eventually stopping, climate change effects. All I am hoping to point out here is that 
emissions do not appear to be the most optimal object of distribution. Emissions are 
ultimately an unnecessary means to a desirable end and I believe the problems of climate 
change can be better answered if we instead examine other means to these desirable ends, 
as well as these ends in and of themselves. Strategies that focus on emissions as our 
object of distribution may lead to desirable changes and outcomes, but I think if we 
change what we are focusing on distributing, these desirable changes and outcomes can 
be achieved more directly and efficiently. It is unnecessary and in many ways counter-
productive to view emissions as crucial to our positive aspects of distribution, i.e. 
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development, and as a good that ought to be distributed. What we are in search of, and 
what should be our main focus, is something that can provide this development, while not 
further contributing to unnecessary harms.  
Lukas Meyer and Dominic Roser in their article, “Distributive Justice and Climate 
Change. The Allocation of Emission Rights” also ask the question “what is to be 
distributed?” They state it is “Emissions of course” but qualify that what they are really 
interested in are the “benefits from emissions” or more precisely, “the benefits from 
emission generating activities.”10 They make this distinction and then swiftly move once 
again to talking about emissions trading, perhaps not fully realizing the importance of 
their distinction. The word that should be focused on in the phrase “benefits from 
emissions” is benefits, not emissions. And if it is benefits, such as faster travel or 
refrigeration, with which we are really concerned, once again we can point out how 
unnecessary emissions really are. There is no need to lump these benefits and emissions 
into the same object of distribution as if they are inseparable. With ongoing innovations 
in energy production it is becoming clear that there are many alternatives to emission 
producing energy sources that can lead to these same benefits, or will be able to replace 
these carbon based energies in the somewhat near future. Since emissions are neither 
necessary, nor the most optimal object of distribution, especially with regards to the 
positive aspect we are concerned with, why don’t we just focus on what Meyer and Roser 
are really interested in: benefits. And since we have divorced benefits from being always 
and necessarily conceptually linked to emissions, we are not ultimately concerned with 
what Meyer and Roser call “benefits from emission generating activities” but instead 
with benefits from any reliable and sustainable form of energy.  
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Section 1.2: Defining Benefits 
We have already touched on what some of these benefits might be. Things like 
faster methods of travel, refrigeration, electricity, and even many forms of entertainment.  
For the sake of time and practicality, an attempt to list off every benefit someone can gain 
from having an energy source is not desirable. We must attempt to define these benefits 
in another way. It seems most of the benefits one gets from having an energy source take 
the form of energy leading to some technology which enables the person to do something 
faster, easier, better, or something entirely new. These benefits are often connected to the 
general welfare or well-being of the person. However, while I’m sure a solar panel could 
be hooked up to a device that charges an electric toothbrush, we should be concerned 
with more substantial benefits. These benefits could be something like energy leading to 
a way to distribute medicine faster so as to increase length of life, the refrigeration of 
food to cut back on waste and certain illnesses, or even the ability to interact with other 
people via phone or the internet, which encourages an exchange of ideas and perhaps 
political participation, are. The OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) measures well-being in terms of available jobs, health, housing, civic 
engagement, and health of environment,11 and are the sorts of characteristics I have in 
mind.  
These types of benefits are closely related to what Amartya Sen and Martha 
Nussbaum promote in their versions of the capabilities approach. Essentially, this 
approach focuses on improving the level of functioning a person has, and their ability and 
freedom to achieve this functioning. Sen defines functionings as “beings and doings” 
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where beings are states like being healthy or being educated, and doings consist of 
actions such as the ability to travel or participate in politics. Capabilities, according to 
Sen, are then the real possibilities of freedom a person has to achieve a variety of 
functionings of their choosing. To put in his words capabilities are, “the substantive 
freedoms he or she enjoys to lead the kind of life he or she has reason to value.”12 
Nussbaum provides a list of what she calls, “central human capabilities.” These 
central human capabilities include things like, not dying prematurely, good health, the 
ability to move around as one pleases, having adequate education, having control over 
one’s environment, ability to participate in political decisions, ability to hold property, 
and the ability to enjoy forms of entertainment. In the realm of climate change this could 
also include having safety against future climate harms. Again I am not sure if attempting 
to come up with a specific list is the correct way to go about defining capabilities or, for 
our purposes, benefits, since there are an innumerable amount of capabilities and benefits 
across a myriad of cultures that would be hard to capture under some basic activity or 
title. Nevertheless, Nussbaum’s list gives us an idea of what types of things we have in 
mind when speaking about capabilities. Anything that results in a person, “Having greater 
freedom to do the things one has reason to value,”13 and their abilities to actual 
accomplish these things, would be an improvement and increase in capabilities.  
Having a reliable form of energy can surely lead to an increase in the possible 
functionings and capabilities a person has, or an improvement in the capabilities and 
functionings they currently have.  Having a lamp which stores energy throughout the day 
so it can be used at night to allow a child to read or study for school is an example of an 
energy source leading to a certain benefit or improvement in this child’s human 
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capability. An energy source leading to a person being able to digitally receive news of a 
political decision or governmental meeting may lead to this person increasing their 
participation in the politics that affects their life, leading to an increase in control this 
person has over their environment and context. In his book “Development as Freedom” 
Sen calls poverty “capability deprivation.” (87) Since areas that don’t have a reliable 
form of energy from which to derive benefits are typically also poor areas, the lack of 
reliable energy can also be thought of as a capability depriver.  
Moving back to our original goal, we can take benefits from activities that result 
from an energy source to be very closely related to the thing that Sen is promoting his 
capabilities approach. These benefits are the increase in possible human functionings a 
person is capable of achieving that result from having a reliable source of energy. 
Therefore the goal of distributive justice in regards to climate change is to ensure that 
everyone has a reliable source of energy so as to meet a certain level of capabilities.  
However, since controlling and limiting emissions is still an important element of the 
climate change problem, we need show how this capabilities approach answers this need.  
For if all we cared about were increasing the level of functionings and capabilities of 
people in poor undeveloped parts of the world, we could achieve this through emission 
producing forms of energy. Since much of what has been discussed is operating at the 
conceptual level, it is important to refocus on the practical effects changing our 
distribution focus may have, were it to be accepted.  
 Here it is important we focus not only on the present capabilities but on future 
capabilities as well. Since it is clear that if we continue to pollute and emit carbon into the 
atmosphere the entire Earth will drastically change in ways that will destroy the 
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livelihoods of people across the globe, continuing our reliance on emission generating 
energy sources will eventually lead to a large decrease in the level of capabilities many 
people have. On this topic Felix Fitzroy and Elissaios Papyrakis say, “Since unhindered 
climate change will deprive the poorest in future generations of the basic capability of 
survival, for which there is no compensation, current polluting practices are simply 
ethically unacceptable.”14 Entire nations going underwater due to rising sea levels is 
really the most capability-depriving event one can imagine aside from death. People’s 
entire ways of life and their desired functionings will be destroyed if we continue to rely 
on carbon emitting energy sources. The problems of the world’s current energy 
production are obvious and this benefits/capabilities focused approach has no trouble 
accepting that. As pointed out earlier in our efforts to divorce benefits from emissions, 
benefits, or now capabilities, are not reliant on emission producing forms of technology. 
There is no reason not to pursue other forms of energy production, and in fact it is in the 
interest of capabilities that we do. Therefore the benefits we should focus on and attempt 
to distribute are really benefits from reliable and sustainable energy sources that lead to 
improvements in functionings and capabilities. Pursuing these alternative energy sources 
answers the concerns of both the positive and negative senses of distributive justice. It 
leads to the creation of present benefits while also keeping future harms in check.   
 It is worth briefly noting that there is some debate over whether it is truly 
economically worth it to spend all the money and effort on changing our current energy 
situation to prevent future costs and problems. Some believe that it makes more sense to 
address these problems when we are truly forced to face them decades in the future as we 
will all be more wealthy and, therefore, more able to adequately and efficiently address 
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them later on. The rate at which the economy will grow, how much climate damages will 
actually cost, and how much switching to other energy sources now will actually save us 
are all empirical questions that are up for debate. William Nordhaus, for instance, has 
promoted a discount rate such that future costs and benefits halve in less than 13 years, 
and suggests current action is not economically desirable.15 
 I do not claim to know what the correct discount rate should be, or what 
condition the economy will be in 100 years from now. Weitzman and Gollier believe that 
no one can even claim to know such a thing as they argue that there is no deep principle 
or underlying theory that support this sort of extrapolation of past returns into the distant 
future.16 A complete discussion of the reasonableness of different discount rates, and 
whether addressing the issues of climate change now or deep into the future would be 
more desirable, would take quite some time to fully untangle. I will just state that I 
believe pursuing policy now that can lift the real capabilities and well-being of current 
and future peoples should outweigh any very uncertain beliefs over the trajectory of the 
global economy. It will also be touched upon later that innovations in energy and the 
switch to new energy sources can takes decades to implement. If what is argued for in 
this paper is reasonable then discount rates should not apply, as plans to change energy 
production will need to begin immediately if we are to adequately address the urgent 
need for climate change.   
There are a few more things we should keep in mind if we are to accept this 
benefits/capabilities approach. One important advantage of this approach is how 
successfully it can accommodate differences in cultural norms and practices. Since 
climate change is obviously a global problem, affecting very different societies in very 
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different ways, our approach to solving this problem must respect and take into account 
this diversity. If our goal is to prescribe the increase of reliable sources of energy into the 
areas lacking in benefits/capabilities, we must be wary of assuming, or even encouraging, 
that different cultures should use these energy sources in the same ways or to the same 
extent as those whom developed them.   Luckily, since energy can be used in a seemingly 
infinite number of ways, and since the desired functionings of a person or society are 
generated from that person or society, cultural uniqueness and traditions can still be 
maintained. A solar panel can be used by an Indian family to illuminate some religious 
shrine, or it can be used by someone in Africa to power a light that attracts and kills 
mosquitos. Energy can be used in cultural specific ways to pursue culturally specific 
functionings and prevent culturally specific harms.  
One area where this approach seems possibly worse and harder to implement than 
the emissions focused approach is that benefits, functionings, and capabilities are not 
easily measurable entities. Focusing on emissions is nice in that we can directly measure 
how much a country is emitting and can then decide what to do about it. This is harder to 
do with our new approach. Although there are statistics we can use to analyze benefits 
and capabilities, like those used in welfare economics, it is difficult to believe they will 
be as empirically supported and as easy to measure as emissions are. I believe we can 
accept this fact and still support the benefits/capabilities approach. It seems plausible to 
me that a country could identify a need for an increase in some energy source to allow for 
some new technology, say refrigerators, and that we can support the decision to provide 
this new technology based on our benefits/capabilities approach. Capabilities may not be 
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measurable but they are certainly identifiable. This is something to keep in mind and we 
will come back to it when we discuss the how and among whom questions of distribution.  
 
Section 1.2: What This Means; Setting the Stage 
 If we take benefits from emissions or capabilities to be our main focus then there 
will be obvious implications for how we carry out climate change policy. Here it is clear 
that under our new view climate change can be seen as a poverty and developmental 
problem in addition to being a pollution or strictly environmental problem. Although 
limiting emissions is an important aspect of how we need to tackle the climate change 
problem, this and more can be done efficiently and effectively if we change our focus.  
Climate change, just like poverty or oppression, is a capability depriver. It threatens ways 
of life, destroys homes, and exacerbates the problem of limited avenues of development 
in struggling nations. All of these problems can be answered through innovations in 
energy and distribution of these forms of energy. Whether it is nourishment from food or 
power generated from solar or wind, energy is the source of all action, all functioning, 
and all capability. Energy is the key and necessary aspect to the fulfillment of many of 
our desired functionings. Technology often enables us to achieve the desired “beings and 
doings” put forth by the capabilities approach.  
Here it is important to point out that the purpose of this paper is not to argue for or 
against any energy source that might meet this sustainable and reliable requirement. All 
we must think about when it comes to choosing which energy source to use is to ask is it 
reliable, so as to ensure our functionings and capabilities are secure, and is it sustainable, 
so as to ensure that our functionings and capabilities will not be harmed in the future. 
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Determining whether this is best accomplished through wind or solar or nuclear is not a 
goal of my argument. The only point I hope to show is that carbon based energy sources 
do not satisfy these requirements of reliability and sustainability. While there may be 
controversies surrounding the use of nuclear and the benefits or risks of implementing it, 
we will not get into those intricacies in this paper.   
 If we should move away from focusing strictly on carbon emissions then it will be 
necessary to replace the climate strategies and policies that relied on them as their object 
of distribution. A policy that places emphasis on lifting capabilities, promoting 
development, and does not contribute to future climate harms is needed. The next section 
will show how the points made above manifest themselves as we put them to practice, 
and argue that centering international climate change policy around technology transfer is 
the direction in which we should head. 
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Section 2.0: Why Technology Transfer 
Before we move on to discussing the specifics of how and why technology 
transfer is the most fitting approach to solving many of the climate change problems, it is 
necessary to define what I mean by technology transfer. To fit with our discussion on 
energy and climate change I will take technology transfer to be any strategy or program 
in which some developed nation is focused on improving the current and future 
capabilities of the citizens of some lesser-developed nation by transferring some 
combination of technology, knowledge, and skills. In the realm of climate change this 
will usually be in the form of innovations in renewable energy. Later in this section more 
will be said on the specifics of how this ought to be done but first it is worth pointing out 
some additional ways in which technology transfer programs are more successful than 
other frequently discussed climate change policies and strategies.  
David Schlosberg makes the point that per capita emissions approaches fail to 
take into account the possible differences in capabilities people can have. He states,  
The per capita approach, however, does not take into account the variation in the 
needs of people living in different places; rather, in its equal distribution of 
emission shares, a basic recognition of the differences of place is simply 
dismissed. Yet living in unlike places and environments, and with different ways 
of life with varied needs, means that we might consider differential allocations, 
more locally defined. To give one example, a unit of carbon allocation will 
provide a different level of basic need to the person in a mild climate than another 
in a harsher environment.17 
 
 While it is conceivably possible for emissions focused approaches to take into 
account this variance, doing so will require recognizing capabilities or benefits from 
emissions as the key object of distribution. Having to define how much certain emissions 
benefit some people in comparison to others also rids emissions approaches of their one 
real benefit, the exactness to which emissions can be measured and distributed. Instead of 
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being able to distribute emissions purely based on population, defining how emissions 
will be used, and how beneficial they will be to certain communities, forces those who 
promote these strategies to have to attempt to define and measure the benefits that result 
from emissions as well.  
 It may seem that any strategy that results in some underdeveloped country 
receiving monetary benefits, say through a cap-and-trade strategy, would lead to an 
increase in the capabilities of the citizens of that country. Sadly this is often not the case. 
Transparency International has developed a scale that measures the amount of corruption 
present in the government and businesses of each nation. While they admit that no 
country on Earth is completely free from corruption, their research shows that much of 
South America, Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, register as highly corrupt.18 
These areas are home to some of the most underdeveloped nations, as well as the nations 
who will feel the impacts of climate change the hardest. A country like Australia needing 
to pay for the carbon credits of a place like North Korea may result in Australia wanting 
to reduce their emissions, so as to no longer need to pay for more carbon credits. 
However, due to the corruption present in a country like North Korea, little to nothing 
will be done to increase the capabilities of North Koreans, which we have determined to 
be our main focus. Why trust a corrupt government to do what is best for its citizens 
when it may be possible to work together with them?  
Through technology transfer programs, a less corrupt and more developed nation 
will also have something at stake in the success of the strategy, and can help to ensure it 
is carried out accordingly. Giving a corrupt country money without any way to efficiently 
regulate how that money is spent to combat climate change is clearly not the most 
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efficient way to ensure capabilities are increased. In a perfect world cap-and-trade may be 
connected enough to benefits and capabilities to be a desirable option to combat climate 
change with, but corruption makes this an unviable choice. Through the cooperation 
needed to successfully implement technology transfer programs this corruption can be 
avoided and cultural diversity can still be respected.  
This combined with the points argued for earlier, that carbon trading and taxing 
do not adequately address distributing benefits while also reducing harms, shows that 
technology transfer can succeed in areas where carbon taxing and trading may struggle. 
Technology transfer is more directly connected to real capabilities and well-being. 
Technology transfer programs are able to successfully address both the negative and 
positive aspects of distributive justice. These programs can distribute and provide 
benefits through improvements in energy and technology, which leads to improvements 
in welfare. These benefits can be provided while the harms resulting from the emissions 
of developed nations are reduced as new energy options are created and improved.   
 As long as these programs are done well, they will be directly connected to 
increasing the capabilities of real people and do not rely on the good will of corrupt 
governments or economic happenstance. While there will surely still be some uncertainty 
in how technology transfer programs pan out, since part of these programs will be in the 
hands of corrupt governments, and since there are still economic aspects to technology 
transfer in the form of investment and implementation, I believe technology transfer is 
still able to more directly connect with the capabilities of actual people. Technology 
transfer programs have the advantage of being able to be highly specific and focused. A 
problem that is limiting the capabilities of a group of people can be identified and then 
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solved through the introduction of a new technology. One of the points argued for here is 
that in addition to industrial scale technology transfer programs focused on limiting 
emissions, smaller programs designed to lift specific capabilities can and should be 
pursued. There are millions of people who will not feel the benefits of improvements in a 
nations large-scale energy efficiency, but are still in need of capability-lifting 
technologies.  
For instance, there are areas in Africa where wood is difficult to find. Led by the 
International Energy Agency and the group Technology Without Borders, a German tech 
company provided three different types of solar stoves to sixty-six families in South 
Africa where there was a problem with finding wood to use in preparing food. The team 
involved in providing these stoves followed up by interviewing 200 households to 
determine which of the three stoves satisfied the criteria of being safe, user-friendly and 
reliable. While some work still needs to be done on this project, there are now solar 
stoves on sale in markets in South Africa for as cheap as $30.19 As development 
continues this price will continue to go down and the stoves will become more and more 
commercially viable.  
This technology transfer program was able to find a specific problem that was 
limiting the capabilities of some group of people, identify a technological solution to that 
problem, and conduct research to determine the success of its implementation in order to 
make adjustments accordingly. While there are certainly still limitations with current 
solar stove technology, such as energy storage and the ability to use them at night, this 
case of technology transfer is a good example of how these types of programs should be 
structured. Those working on this project noted that to help ensure success in future 
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programs, “Technical development must be defined by the needs of the user, assessing if 
a technology is suitable to a region and its people is critical, and technological 
modifications are often necessary to conform to local conditions.”20 Since this type of 
foreign aid is relatively new, it is to be expected that not all instances of technology 
transfer will be successful. As more technology transfer programs come to fruition, the 
specifics and guidelines that best ensure their success can be practiced and refined.  
This is clearly more consistent with our capabilities/benefits focus than, for 
instance, hoping South Africa uses money gained through a carbon trading system to help 
these villages cook their food, or that carbon taxing leads to some innovation in a 
developed nation which could at some point in the future be used in a South African 
Village. These communities are outside the group of people who would feel the benefits 
of industrial scale energy improvements and are often overlooked when it comes to 
policies focused on emissions. Technology transfer programs are capable of satisfying a 
certain level of specificity that brings these communities back into the picture.  
 This specificity also connects back to one of the advantages of focusing on 
capabilities. Since a person’s capabilities are reliant on their specific circumstances and 
desired functionings, the fact that technology transfer programs can recognize and act 
according to these specifics is another reason technology transfer appears to be an 
appropriate match. Technology transfer programs are able to identify culturally specific 
problems and then work together with people in that culture, like in the example of 
interviewing households in South Africa to determine which solar stove was the best fit 
and how it could be improved. Energy and technology are both powerful and highly 
adaptive capability promoters. They can be shaped and reshaped to address essentially 
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any need, improve the efficiency or possibility of any activity, and fit any culture. This 
ability to be specific and modifiable are two of the key reasons technology transfer 
programs are so apt at fulfilling the needs of international climate change policy.  
 Technology transfer programs have the advantage of being able to be molded into 
a macro strategy that can address nationwide energy improvements or into a micro 
strategy where particular capabilities lacking in a certain area are focused on. In sections 
2.1 and 2.2 potential problems that arise with this micro approach are addressed, and in 
section 2.3 what is needed for success on the large scale will be discussed.   
 
Section 2.1: Energy With a Human Face 
 In his 1973 book “Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered” E. F. 
Schumacher promotes the idea of “technology with a human face.” Although the state of 
technology has changed drastically in the 43 years since Schumacher wrote about it, his 
views on the role technology should have in helping lesser-developed countries develop 
are still pertinent today. Schumacher feared that many technology transfer programs run 
the risk of “making human hands and brains redundant.”21 Development programs 
focused on technology transfer should provide tools that encourage and promote the use 
of “the priceless resources which are possessed by all human beings, their clever brains 
and skillful hands,”22 instead of technologies that completely remove or overly expedite 
certain practices or traditions. Schumacher called the technology that keeps this priceless 
resource in focus “intermediate technology”, or also, “self-help technology”, “democratic 
technology”, or “people’s technology”. These forms of technology are not exclusive to 
the ultra rich or knowledgeable and are easy to understand. They are not overly complex 
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but are still improvements on the ancient or indigenous technologies of those whom 
would receive it. Schumacher noticed even back in the 1970’s that technology was 
becoming more and more complex and often superfluous. He believed that for things like 
technology transfer to actually lift the well-being of those in the undeveloped parts of the 
world we needed to “make things simple again.”23 What most underdeveloped countries 
need are tools to help them secure basic human needs and desires. Improving ways to 
obtain and store food, travel, communicate, and learn are some examples of these needs 
and can be thought of as being similar to the essential human capabilities that we noted 
from Nussbaum back in section 1. Satisfying these types of needs and lifting these types 
of capabilities should be the primary focus of the micro technology transfer programs. 
After these essential capabilities are met, a slow increase and evolution in technological 
complexity can take place if doing so will also increase capabilities.   
 By bringing unneeded or overly complex technologies to the third world we can 
run the risk of doing the opposite of what we have defined as our goals. On this point Sen 
states, “economic development as we know it may actually be harmful for a nation, since 
it may lead to the elimination of its traditions and cultural heritage.”24 Instead of lifting 
the capabilities of those in underdeveloped countries we may end up drastically damaging 
their culture and essential ways of life. I agree with Schumacher that we must be wary of 
diminishing the importance of “clever brains and skillful hands.” For example, since 
many of the communities in lesser-developed nations still rely on small-scale subsistence 
farming, immediately assuming that providing these communities with the latest John 
Deere tractor and an iPhone may be harmful. Doing so could potentially lead to a 
destruction of many of the cultural values present in that community. While this may lift 
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their capabilities in some ways, by giving them more free time and the means to acquire 
useful information, doing so also results in a loss of the priceless resource Schumacher 
promoted For centuries these  “clever brains and skillful hands”, have been crucial tools 
in ensuring the capabilities of these cultures. It will often be better to provide these 
communities with technologies that can enhance their already defined skill sets and 
cultural norms, not technologies that attempt to redefine these skill sets. Again this is not 
to say that those developing the technology transfer programs are in a position where they 
can determine what is best for these other cultures. Reconciling traditional cultural values 
with new technologies is a pragmatic challenge that must be addressed with constant 
communication between the parties involved.  
This again gets back to the point mentioned earlier that cultural diversity must 
always be kept in mind. Technology should be used to address issues identified by these 
cultures as being problematic and as was noted in the example on solar stoves, “technical 
development must be defined by the needs of the user.” Imposing any technology or way 
of life onto a community because we, the “developed” nation believe it to be better would 
most certainly be detrimental to the culture of that community.  Potentially harming this 
is a factor we must constantly be aware of. Schumacher promotes providing these small, 
simple, or intermediate technologies, and then letting the culture of the area take over in 
shaping and evolving how these technologies grow and improve.  
Schumacher quotes a British Overseas Development group’s definition of the 
aims of foreign aid as being, “To do what lies within our power to help the developing 
countries to provide their people with the material opportunities for using their talents, of 
living a full and happy life and steadily improving their lot.”25 The key words here for me 
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are “their talents.” These culturally specific talents are what technology transfer programs 
run the risk of putting in danger. Technology has the force and influence to immediately 
change the way of life of whoever uses it. We must be cognizant of this fact as we plan 
what type energy, and subsequent technologies, fit well within the cultural framework of 
the communities we are trying to assist. Immediately prescribing whatever technology 
works or is popular in New York, Tokyo, or London is both arrogant and counter-
intuitive. It would be wrong to assume technology can be prescribed like a medicine that 
treats all diseases equally no matter where it occurs. The goal of the technologies in 
question needs to be well thought out and defined, and this is accomplished through 
constant interaction between the parties involved. There is a great deal of literature 
devoted to development studies and these sorts of issues. While I am not an expert of 
development, I believe this point on the importance of dialogue and interaction, 
especially in regards to these small-scale, capability-oriented technologies that are being 
transferred between vastly different cultures, should be uncontroversial. It may help to 
look at another example of a successful technology transfer program and how this 
dialogue and interaction contributed to its success.   
In 1984 American engineer Harold Burris founded a solar energy company in 
Kenya whose focus was on providing energy needs for households and schools in rural 
Kenya.26 Instead of developing the technology in America and using American citizens to 
transport and install the necessary systems, Burris developed a training and educational 
program for young unemployed Kenyans who were then tasked with learning about and 
installing the solar equipment. The fact that Kenyans themselves were the ones who 
understood this technology and took part in its implementation had great effect on it 
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spreading across the country. Sales of solar equipment rose to over 100,000 units. It 
currently sits at around 20,000 systems each year and there are more than 40 Kenyan 
manufacturers that now provide this service.27 The fact that Kenyans were included in the 
process and trusted with taking it over led to the solar market in Kenya developing with 
little support from other nations. Since Kenyans understood the technology and were in 
command of its implementation, solar energy spread throughout Kenya quickly just by 
word-of-mouth. Seventy-five percent of those who use solar said they first learned of it 
by hearing about it from friends and neighbors.28 The fact that Burris included Kenyans 
in on the project and worked with them in the beginning phases of this solar movement 
played a huge part in the success and efficacy of solar in Kenya.  
  Just like in the example of the solar stoves in South Africa, a constant dialogue 
between those involved in developing the specific technology and those who are in need 
of some technological assistance, in order to figure out which form of the technology is 
most easily understood, helpful, and relevant to the problems being faced, is necessary. 
This dialogue allows for those leading a certain technology transfer program to 
understand what type of technology is really needed. The culturally specific capabilities 
of the community, the talents of those in the community, and how the new technology 
will harm or reinforce these talents while still in the technological development process, 
can all be taken into account.   
Amartya Sen is again helpful in summarizing the points made in this section as he 
writes, “If a traditional way of life has to be sacrificed to escape grinding poverty or 
miniscule longevity, then it is the people directly involved who must have the opportunity 
to participate in deciding what should be chosen.”29 Energy and technology both have the 
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ability to take into account the specific capabilities these communities may have, and can 
be shaped in an innumerable amount of ways. This flexibility allows them both to truly 
have a “human face” in the way Schumacher promoted.  
 
Section 2.2: Some Initial Worries 
There are a few obvious concerns that arise whenever we discuss strategies whose 
aim it is to aid development in struggling nations. One of the questions that pops up when 
it comes to technology transfer programs is how to make sure the country receiving aid 
does not develop some dependence on those giving the aid. Especially when it comes to 
technology we can run the risk of the underdeveloped country adapting to the new 
technology and becoming reliant on its creation and distribution. Instead of taking the 
technology and shaping it into their own, the underdeveloped country could just become 
another consumer, reliant on, and desperate for, more technological aid.  
Since the goal of technology transfer programs should not be just to put a 
technological Band-Aid on whatever problem it is addressing but instead to introduce 
new tools which can lead to the creation of a new and improved environment that reduces 
poverty and fosters capabilities, it will be useful to take a step back and view what kind 
of poverty we are really focused on.  
Schumacher is again useful here as he points out that there are material and 
immaterial forms of poverty. He believes that the material forms of poverty, like lack of 
wealth or property, result from the immaterial forms of poverty, such as lack of 
education, freedom, organization, and discipline.30 These immaterial forms of poverty are 
akin to another tenet of the capabilities approach that has been mentioned earlier: 
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substantive freedoms. Things like the ability to live a long life, engage in political 
discourse, and obtain a satisfactory education are all substantive freedoms that reduce 
immaterial poverty and increase capabilities. On first glance it may seem like technology 
transfer is more concerned with material poverty, since after all, technology is often seen 
as a form of material wealth. But really the goal here is again to provide tools that can lift 
people from immaterial poverty and secure their substantive freedoms. Technology 
transfer can assist a community in improving important attributes beyond material wealth 
and possession, such as their education, health, and political participation. New 
technologies can assist in removing certain concerns a community may have over the 
security of basic capabilities, such as obtaining adequate food, and can enable them to 
expand their desired functionings into activities that improve these types of freedoms.  
Anytime anyone receives help they, for a time, depend or rely on those helping 
them. This however does not mean they should not be helped. It may be true that 
technology transfer programs will create an initial state of dependence. But if these 
programs can successfully combat immaterial poverty, then those societies who once 
were dependent upon aid can eventually develop and flourish on their own. As mentioned 
earlier, eventually these societies can begin to shape the provided technologies into 
something new and unique to their circumstances, moving beyond the stage of 
dependence.  As was seen in the example of solar panels in Kenya, if those receiving aid 
are fully a part of the initial stages of the technology transfer program, this initial 
dependency can be very brief or seemingly nonexistent.  
There are some more practical worries that arise from the implementation of 
technology transfer programs. For instance, Kenneth Markowitz, a clean energy and 
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environmental legal consultant, states, “enforcement of intellectual property law is one of 
the greatest concerns of industrialized countries and private vendors when conducting 
business in developing economies. Companies are often unwilling to initiate projects or 
sell their technologies in countries where there is a reasonable likelihood that their 
products will be copied and sold for less money by local firms.”31 These rights have been 
strengthened recently as more countries involved in international trade have begun to 
enforce basic copyright and trademark protection. Also the risk of companies losing 
money due to cheaper local competition has been lessened as both international 
organizations, like the Global Environment Facility, and individual nations, such as India 
and the United States, have established financial incentives to promote the transfer of 
climate change related technology. On this topic Markowitz in 2007 stated, “India, for 
example, established financial incentives, including excise tax relief and facilitated loans, 
to promote foreign private sector engagement, particularly with regards to renewable 
energy. The U.S. Department of Commerce estimates that the market in India for 
renewable energy is worth $500 million, that it is growing at an annual rate of 15 percent 
and that with these mechanisms in place it will continue to grow efficiently.”32 These 
incentives and the reduction of the use of tariffs have made investing in technology 
transfer programs both financially and practically more reasonable. This discussion of 
investment and the practical needs that must predate the actual creation of technology 
transfer programs will be touched on more in the subsequent section.  
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Section 2.3:  What Needs To Be Done 
 Before the most recent Conference of Parties (COP21) in Paris, Bill Gates 
released a document titled “Energy Innovation: Why We Need It and How to Get It.” 
Gates starts off by saying the following: 
In 30 years the world will consume much more energy than it does today. 
This should be good news. Wherever access to reliable, affordable energy 
goes up, so does the quality of life. But today more than 1 billion people 
lack access to the most basic energy services. Energy keeps schools and 
businesses running, city lights shining, tractors plowing, and cars and 
trucks moving. Without plentiful energy, the poverty rate could not have 
dropped by more than half since 1990, and hundreds of millions of people 
would have been denied the opportunity to improve their lives.33  
 
Here Gates seems to be agreeing with the main argument in this paper. He 
identifies poverty as being intricately woven into the climate change debate, the need to 
lift people out of poverty by improving their capabilities, and that it is best to do this 
through providing reliable and affordable energy. By linking reliable, affordable energy 
to quality of life, he sees changes in our current state of energy production as being 
crucial to addressing the positive side of distributive justice. Distributing reliable, 
affordable energy to undeveloped nations will lead to an increase in the benefits and 
capabilities whose importance was argued for earlier. Gates states that even if climate 
change did not exist energy innovation should still be one of our main priorities for these 
very reasons.  
 Gates also notes how energy innovation is crucial in addressing the distribution 
of, and contribution to, climate harms that have come from our current energy schemes. 
He writes that more than 80% of the energy used today comes from fossil fuels. In order 
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to limit warming to 2 degrees Celsius, which is the goal many suggest we should aim for, 
the world’s largest emitters must reduce their emissions by 80% by 2050, and we 
basically need to move away from fossil fuels completely by the end of the century.34 
Since to the most recent IPCC report states that energy-related greenhouse gas emissions 
account for around 70% of total emissions35, the only viable way to meet these goals, and 
to limit the future capability deprivation resulting from climate change, is to switch to 
alternative sources of energy. While alternative energy has been improving in terms of 
efficiency and cost, estimates coming from the IEA (International Energy Agency) show 
that with current wind and solar technologies we can only hope to cut the worlds annual 
emissions by 22% by 2050.36  There are glaring flaws in these energy sources. For 
instance, ways to efficiently store the energy gained through sunlight and wind to be used 
while the sun is not shining and the wind is not blowing need to be addressed before 
these alternative energies can really take the place of carbon on the global scale. The only 
way around problems like these is innovation. We simply do not have the technology as 
of now to realistically ask the world to move away from coal. Doing so now would 
actually cause a reduction in capabilities in many parts of the world.  
 Gates believes that government and private sector investment is critical to 
successfully growing and improving alternative energy sources at the rate we need it to. 
Due to the fact that energy investments take such a long time to pay off, because of the 
hurdles faced in implementation and transition, it is often unwise for investors to take the 
risk in hoping their investment pays off decades down the road. For instance, Gates uses 
data from the International Energy Agency to show that the pharmaceutical and 
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information technology industries invest 20% and 15% of their respective revenues in 
research and development while the energy industry invests only 0.23%.37 
Since this is a sad fact about the nature of energy technology, Gates believes government 
funding plays a crucial role in shrinking this gap. Unfortunately, the United States 
government, for example, has provided drastically little support when it comes to funding 
research and development. The U.S. government directs only 0.4% of its total energy 
spending into research and development. In terms of percentage, this is 22 times lower 
than what is spent on defense and military research.38  
 The private sector also plays an important role. Gates admits that the financial 
risks usually outweigh the financial rewards when it comes to investing in clean energy.39 
Here he calls on investors “who can afford to be patient, and whose goal is as much to 
accelerate innovation as it is to turn a profit.”40 Luckily, many other billionaire investors, 
who share this patience and good will, have joined Gates in the Breakthrough Energy 
Coalition, where they plan on investing billions in energy research and innovation.  
Also joining these private investors, 20 nations, including the United States, 
China, Germany, India, and the United Kingdom, are vowing to double their spending on 
research and development. These improvements in the state of energy innovation have 
just taken place over the last year so we are still waiting to see how successful these 
initiatives will be, but it is a promising start. These leading nations moving away from 
carbon emitting energy sources while also innovating new ways for undeveloped nations 
to develop, will hopefully significantly reduce future climate harms while distributing 
energy benefits.  
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 I agree with Mr. Gates that investing more in energy innovation is the way 
forward as it is the first step in implementing technology transfers programs and new 
energy sources. Since completely switching from carbon based energies to current 
alternative energies would result in a loss in capabilities for much of the developed 
world, energy innovation is necessary. However, it is also important to remember the 
ideas of Schumacher presented earlier in this section, and how they apply to the strategies 
proposed by Gates. Bill Gates may accurately tell us “why we need innovation and how 
to get it” but he doesn’t address how we should use it.  
Innovation and investment are key elements needed to improve the state of 
technology transfer. In regards to large-scale technology transfer programs that deal with 
a nation’s infrastructure, basic ideals like efficiency or cost can shape how these 
programs proceed. However, when it comes to small scale technologies, specific human 
needs and desires need to be taken into account. Gates only focuses on what is needed to 
get energy innovation off the ground, which is important, but more needs to be said on 
what needs to be done to ensure that these innovations are applicable, useful, and actually 
desired. Improving solar efficiency or battery storage capacity are needed, but only 
focusing on blind improvement, and not how these energy sources will best be used by 
those who need them is ignoring the “technology with a human face” that Schumacher 
promoted. The technological innovators need to be in constant communication with those 
who need the technology in order to ensure the technology being created can be shaped in 
ways that most adequately and efficiently improve capabilities. Programs like the one 
mentioned earlier in the solar stove and solar in Kenya examples are essential to the 
success of the technology transfer process. Programs that identify a problem or need, 
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create ties between the manufacturers and those who will eventually use the technology, 
and adjust the technology being created to fit specific cultural and environmental 
contexts, need to be the tech transfer norm.  
 While there are many possible technology transfer programs that could proceed 
and succeed with current energy technologies, the innovation Gates is after is still needed 
for technology transfer to adequately address the giant problem that is climate change. 
Improvements in things like the storage capacity of batteries and the efficiency of wind 
and solar are necessary first steps that must be taken before technology transfer can really 
take off. Since energy on its own is in a sense “faceless,” the worries of Schumacher that 
technology must have a “human face” can be shelved until these innovations are met, and 
then brought back into focus when these new and improved energy sources are used in 
powering technologies that will lift essential capabilities. In many ways energy is without 
direction until it manifests itself in powering a certain technology. While the basic 
characteristics of energy sources, such as relying on solar or wind, will be determined by 
the characteristics of the area they are being used in, it is not until these energy sources 
are applied to power actual technologies that our detailed concerns of culture and specific 
capabilities need to be discussed.  
Again it is worth noting the potential this sort of approach has. In Gates’ 
conclusion he notes that, “It is hard to overstate the impact that clean, affordable, reliable 
energy will have. It will make most countries energy-independent, stabilize prices, and 
provide low- and middle-income countries the resources they need to develop their 
economies and help more people escape poverty—all while keeping global temperatures 
from rising more than 2 degrees.”41 However, this type of approach does take time. 
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Innovating and then applying these innovations to address specific needs will take 
decades of work and communication. If we are to reduce emissions by 80% by 2050 as 
Gates suggests we must, our efforts must start immediately. As mentioned earlier, while 
innovations are underway, there are many successful technology transfer programs that 
could be implemented now. Even programs focused solely on increasing efficiency in 
large-scale power sources would be extremely beneficial. Patrick Thollander and Jenny 
Palm point out that, “a shift toward improved energy efficiency in industry is crucial to 
limiting carbon dioxide emissions.”42 Of course it will also be necessary for these nations 
leading innovation efforts to not only implement programs to share these innovations 
with developing nations, but also to transition into using these new energy sources 
themselves.  
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Section 3.0: Who Pays and Why? 
 
 
 The question of who should fund and lead technology transfer programs was 
touched on in the last section and has been an underlying assumption throughout. While 
it is obvious that developed nations are the most viable choice, since they are the ones 
who have the means and ability to most adequately invest in new innovations in energy, it 
is worth examining why they are not only the best choice due to their economic and 
technological abilities, but for moral reasons as well. The idea that the developed nations 
ought to lead the way in paying for efforts to combat climate change effects is not 
controversial. Dale Jamieson notes that in the Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(FCCC) countries committed to combatting climate change by, “assuming ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities’ the developed countries would lead the way by reducing 
their own emissions and transferring technology and financial assistance to developing 
countries.”43 However, since these climate change policy documents are often riddled 
with ambiguous language and lack specifics regarding strict commitments and deadlines, 
not enough has been done recently to adequately address the urgency of climate change 
and this question of funding. Since it would be nice to not have to rely on the good will of 
leading nations and billionaires, reflecting on our moral intuitions and what moral 
responsibilities, if any, the developed nations have to assist the lesser-developed nations, 
may help shed some light on the “among whom” question of distributive justice, and how 
it applies to climate change policy.  
 Paul Baer, in his “Adaptation to Climate Change: Who Pays Whom,” uses moral, 
legal, and scientific modes of thinking to examine the responsibilities and obligations the 
developed nations have to take the lead in paying for adaptation to, and prevention from, 
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climate change effects. Like Singer, Baer asks us to view the climate and atmospheric 
systems affected by carbon emissions as a “Life-Support Commons.”44 It is clear that all 
humans share in the common resource that is the atmosphere and that the health of this 
atmosphere is crucial to the livelihoods of everyone dependent upon it. Baer defines the 
climate problem here as being the fact that, “deliberate acts that create greenhouse 
pollution for one party’s benefit will inevitably cause some amount of harm to others.”45 
Baer notes the beliefs that to do something that causes harm to other people in order to 
benefits one’s self is wrong, and that when you cause someone else harm, say by 
damaging their property, it is usually expected of you to pay for or repair these damages, 
are as close as you get to universally agreed upon ethical principles. Simon Caney also 
believes that if we reflect on our moral commitments we will see anthropogenic climate 
change, and the actions that contribute to it, violate certain human rights, such as the right 
to life, health, and perhaps development, and are immoral because of this. These types of 
moral intuitions can be found in, and defended by, many legal and moral standards of 
thought.  
Baer refers to environmentally focused “rights-based regulations”46 and tort law 
as two instances where law can be useful in analyzing harms done to a life support 
commons. Any actions, such as excessive pollution, which violate standards of public 
health, Baer says, can be “subject to criminal penalties similar to other violations of rights 
to protection from harm to person or property.”47 Tort law, which Baer defines as “civil 
law allowing harmed parties to obtain compensation from the party causing the harm,”48 
seems like a legal precedent that has a place in climate change policy. Climate change 
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clearly harms people, their property, and their rights so appears to be a perfect fit for this 
type of legal reasoning.  
Unfortunately this is not the case. In fact, in 2013 the Alaskan village of Kivalina, 
which needs to be relocated due to the effects of climate change, attempted to sue a few 
energy companies, including Exxon Mobil Corp, for contributing to the increase in 
greenhouse gasses that rendered their area uninhabitable.49 The case was thrown out due 
to the reasoning that, “the village hadn’t shown causation between the alleged damage 
and the defendants actions.” In addition to this one example, the recent agreement 
reached by the COP 21 in Paris states that, “the Agreement does not involve or provide a 
basis for any liability or compensation.” These two examples show that even though 
many of our legal and moral everyday norms and practices seem like they could address 
the effects of climate change, climate change policy usually avoids applying them.  
Jamieson states that the problems of climate change “swamp the machinery of 
morality.”50 Some reasons for this disconnect between our moral/legal intuitions and 
climate policy are that climate change is the type of problem whose scale and origins 
escape our everyday laws and ethics. Just as the court ruled in the case concerning the 
Alaskan village, it is hard to connect certain climate effecting actions with specific 
negative climate change effects. Although when I drive my car I am surely contributing, 
in some extremely small way, to changing temperatures and rising sea levels on the other 
side of the world, it is difficult to think that such a seemingly morally meaningless action 
can result in such a significant moral harm.  
Jamieson points out three ways in which climate change is different from normal 
every day ethical issues. He states, “apparently innocent acts can have devastating 
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consequence, causes and harms may be diffuse, and causes and harms may be remote in 
space and time.”51 Stephen Gardiner also identifies three troubling aspects of the climate 
change problem as being the “dispersion of causes and effects, fragmentation of agency, 
and institutional inadequacy.”52 Gardiner claims that due to the vastness of climate 
change, we can’t connect causes and effects, and therefore cannot determine agency and 
responsibility. Because of these challenges, there is the risk of “moral corruption.” This 
corruption manifests in the form of distraction, complacency, doubt, delusion, and 
hypocrisy.53  Also, a “tragedy of the commons” appears to be present. Gardiner states that 
it is both, “collectively rational to cooperate and restrict overall pollution,” and also 
“individually rational not to restrict one’s own pollution.”54 Since the negative effects 
one’s individual actions have on the environment are relatively small, and the positive 
effects using pollution creating energy sources has on one’s life are relatively large, 
developing some enforceable sanctions seems impossible. No country desires severe 
climate change but every country seemingly prefers to continue actions that support their 
own prosperity, regardless of what others do. Whether it is due to confusion, corruption, 
or selfish desires, a sense of responsibility and liability seems to be lacking in the context 
of climate change.  
Baer distinguished between two types of liability: fault-based and strict liability.55 
Fault-based liability is used when a person or groups intent or negligence results in some 
harm while strict liability is used regardless of any fault but instead solely requires that a 
person or groups actions resulted in the harm in question. Applying fault-based liability 
to climate change is tricky. For instance, when I drive my car it is surely not one of my 
intentions to alter the climate in any way. I believe it is safe to say that no carbon based 
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energy source has been used with this harmful intention in mind. It was surely never 
Exxon’s intent to promote and sell something that will result in the forced relocation of a 
small Alaskan village. The relationship between these actions and the harms they result in 
are much more disconnected than everyday examples that fit nicely under our moral and 
legal intuitions.  
Although intent based liability doesn’t seem to be useful here, negligence, in 
principle, certainly might be. Whenever I fly across the country or drive to the store I am 
definitely neglecting to properly examine the global impacts the emissions resulting from 
these actions will have on the climate. Exxon’s entire existence depends on their 
negligence concerning what effects their actions are causing and the negligence of their 
customers.  
Negligence is also often not discussed in climate change policy, especially since a 
great deal of the emissions that are now affecting the climate were from a time when 
those who were emitting really could not fully understand all of the harmful outcomes of 
their actions. To use negligence as a guide for determining liability would be difficult, 
especially in regards to historical emissions. However Baer points out “Such fault-based 
liability would clearly apply to damage caused by greenhouse pollution emitted since the 
time when the risks of anthropogenic climate change were widely recognized.”56 
However, if strict liability can be successfully argued for then we can avoid the 
difficult issues of intent and negligence. Baer states that it does at first seem reasonable to 
argue against applying strict liability to climate change as many would ask, “why should 
I be responsible for harms I couldn’t know I was causing and thus could not have 
prevented?”57 Baer counters with the also reasonable claim that, “if there are unexpected 
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harms from some activities, shouldn’t the party that benefited from the actions bear the 
costs of the harm rather than the victims.”58 Shue also calls upon our moral intuitions as 
he argues that because developed nations have both the greater ability to pay, and have 
contributed more to the problem at hand, they ought to be leading the financial efforts to 
reduce these climate harms. 59 
Put back into our main focus on capabilities, it seems correct to say that if one 
group acts in such a way that results in an increase in their capabilities at the cost of 
decreasing the capabilities of another group, the benefitting group ought to bear the costs 
of these harmful capability decreasing results, regardless of whether the benefitting group 
knew they were causing this harm or not. The United States for example, which is one of 
the leading emitters and has benefitted greatly from emission based technologies, by all 
moral and legal intuitions, has a responsibility to not only limit their contributions to the 
problem, but also to help pay for the countries who are currently experiencing climate 
harm, or who will experience it in the near future. If a nation is in the position where they 
are able to give this kind of assistance, then they are likely in that position because of past 
and present emissions and the capabilities that these have created. If a nation is in this 
position then, as we have noted plenty of moral and legal thought points to the belief that 
they have a responsibility to help. Drawing from Shue again, telling these developed 
nations to lead the charge in fixing the problem is similar to a parent telling their child to 
clean up the mess they have made.60 As this paper has argued, the best way for developed 
nations to address this responsibility is through energy innovation and technology 
transfer programs.  
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Energy innovation is a responsibility of developed nations since it is necessary for 
them to address the negative aspect of distributive justice by reducing their own 
emissions, and the harms that result from them. Technology transfer is also needed since 
the accumulation of these emissions has made it so undeveloped nations cannot develop 
in ways that might be easiest or most convenient. According to the IPCC, even if 
greenhouse gas levels were kept at year 2000 levels, the earth would still be expected to 
warm at a rate of about 0.1°C per decade.61 Like Singer’s sinkhole, our atmosphere is 
already overflowing with carbon emissions. The pollution of developed nations has 
harmed developing nations by removing certain possibilities of development centered on 
carbon, since doing so will contribute to the creation of future capability depriving harms. 
Technology transfer programs can compensate for this harm and provide means for 
adapting to, and preparing for, future climate change harms. Reducing emissions, 
assisting in development, and assisting in adaptation are the three main climate change 
responsibilities developed nations have. Likewise, excess emissions causing a disruption 
in possible development and inability to adapt to climate harms are the key harms with 
which I am concerned.  
While someone like Jamieson may argue that our moral intuitions fail to 
adequately address climate change, I do not believe this always has to be the case. As the 
harms of climate change begin to unfold, as we learn more about what actions have 
contributed to the creation of these harms, and as we think critically about the ethical 
issues behind it, our moral intuitions will become more easily applicable. As Daniel 
Gilbert writes, currently climate change does not “violate our moral sensibilities.” While 
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global warming is certainly bad, “it doesn’t make us feel nauseated or angry or disgraced, 
and thus we don’t feel compelled to rail against it.”62  
While this may be true for the general population who has not thought critically 
about climate change, many who have do feel “nauseated, angry, and disgraced.” I do not 
believe these people are somehow inherently morally superior, but instead that when a 
person critically and truthfully thinks about climate change, and the actions that have 
caused it, they realize their basic moral intuitions can and should apply to climate change. 
We ought to call upon people to examine how their moral intuitions apply to the problem 
of climate change, and what actions ought to be done to address it.  Jamieson again is 
useful here as he states: 
One of the most important benefits of viewing global environmental problems as 
moral problems is that this brings them into the domain of dialogue, discussion, 
and participation. Rather than being management problems that governments or 
experts solve for us, when seen as ethical problems, they become problems for all 
of us to address, both as political actors and as everyday moral agents.63  
 
It is my belief that as the public awareness of climate change improves, so will its 
intuitions regarding it. Policy will hopefully reflect these improvements, and developed 
nations will feel compelled to do what our intuitions suggest.  
 
Section 3.1 Who Receives Aid 
 While it may seem like the communities that are completely undeveloped are the 
ones who ought to receive aid first, really those that are already in the process of 
developing are the most fitting candidates. These communities are already reliant on 
carbon based energy in some ways but are at an important crossroads where transitioning 
to alternative energy sources is still very possible. Bill Gates again touches on this issue 
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in his paper when he states, “The opportunity is especially clear for developing countries. 
Their most immediate need is to keep their hospitals and schools running and help their 
economies grow. If forced to choose between energy that is clean and energy that is 
reliable and affordable, it is completely responsible to prioritize the health and welfare of 
their people today over the serious implications of an uncertain future with climate 
change. We need to resolve this dilemma by making energy reliable, affordable, and 
clean.”64  
In order to most adequately address climate change as well as poverty, 
communities that will go down the path of carbon based energy as their only means of 
energy if not otherwise assisted are at the top of the list as qualifying for technology 
transfer programs. In focusing on these nations, the greatest amount of potential harms 
from future pollution can be eliminated. Countries like China and India that are 
progressing rapidly, have the 3rd and 5th largest coal reserves in the world respectively, 
but still have large amounts of poverty ridden areas deprived of any energy source, are 
ideal places where technology transfer could be of some assistance. These are nations 
where the possible benefits that can be created, and the harms that can be prevented, are 
obvious and numerous.  
 It is also interesting to note here that if the moral reasons to aid these communities 
touched on in the last section are not persuasive, we can argue that it is in our own 
interest as developed nations to aid countries in pursuing non-carbon emitting energy 
sources, as not doing so will result in increasing our own climate harms. The United 
States, for example, will face many of its own extreme climate harms were these nations 
to go all in on carbon based energy sources. Whether it is rising sea levels forcing 
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relocation of major cities in Florida or extreme droughts in areas like California, if we 
adopt a completely self-interested view on climate change it may still be in our best 
interest to promote technology transfer programs in places like India and China. Even if 
we decide to not care at all about the well-being of people on the other side of the earth, 
billions of more people emitting carbon is something we should try to avoid for our own 
sakes. We are a global community that shares both global resources and global harms. 
Even if it is solely for selfish reasons, we should be concerned with how these resources 
are abused, and how these harms are created.  
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Conclusion: 
 What has been presented here provides another way of examining the problem of 
climate change. As was pointed out at the start, there are many ways to effectively 
analyze climate change and how we ought best confront it. This paper had a limited scope 
and, therefore, ignored many aspects of the climate change problem that are crucially 
important and may affect how technology transfer programs are best implemented. For 
example, this paper has not touched on what duties, if any, we have towards the natural 
world and how our energy innovation efforts must take these into account. Although this 
paper was focused on the anthropogenic sources of climate change, and how we can best 
remedy these harmful practices, the fact that climate change is largely anthropogenic 
does not mean our climate change policies should be anthropocentric.  As David 
Schlosberg points out, “it may also be possible to extend recognition and a capabilities 
approach beyond the idea of the environmental needs of human functioning to the realm 
of the functioning of nature and, in particular, ecological systems.”65  
 Another important area left out of this discussion, but certainly related to it, is the 
ability of technology to address climate change through climate engineering. Climate 
engineering could possibly be a part of some technology transfer programs, since 
engineering the climate in a certain way could definitely address and protect the 
capabilities of vulnerable communities. Climate engineering is full of its own ethical and 
practical problems so was not touched on here but could be another interesting element of 
the points argued for in this essay. Ignoring these and many more aspects of climate 
change was not to dismiss their importance but only done for the purpose manageability.  
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 There are also many practical aspects of technology transfer ranging from 
specifics in international politics to global economics that are deserving of further 
detailed examination. These are no doubt important and crucial to the implementation of 
technology transfer programs. However, as stated earlier, the main goal of this paper was 
not to argue for some very specific guideline to follow, but instead to show the benefits 
of the technology transfer approach, and how viewing climate change as a poverty 
problem that affects human capabilities can lead us to new and interesting ways to argue 
for climate change action. 
 By looking at climate change through the lens of distributive justice we were able 
to notice the need to address how climate change is affecting the presence of benefits, or 
capabilities, in developing nations, and the existence of harms these developing nations 
face. We determined that climate change’s impact on future development in these 
undeveloped nations is of crucial importance and that technology transfer programs, 
instead of just carbon taxing or carbon trading strategies, is the most promising strategy 
that can address this issue. While decreasing carbon emissions is undoubtedly a crucial 
aspect of the climate change issue, solutions focused on energy innovation and 
technology transfer programs are able to address the need for developed nations to reduce 
their own emissions, while also assisting nations who have been harmed by these 
emissions and the changing climate. The responsibility developed nations have to pursue 
energy innovation and technology transfer was discussed and certain potential problems 
these technology transfer programs could face were presented and addressed through 
Schumacher and two case studies.  
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In doing all this, this paper attempted to show that energy innovation and 
technology transfer programs are necessary if we are to adequately address the urgency 
of climate change. The climate change discussion is often too narrowly focused on 
limiting emissions. The Paris agreement does mention technology transfer as a viable 
strategy, but it is often done in passing, and not given much focus. The Paris document 
“requests” that technology transfer programs are considered, but lumps these strategies 
alongside other very broad concepts like “mitigation, adaptation, finance, and capacity 
building.”66 Energy innovation is also hardly touched upon even though it is described as 
“critical for an effective, long-term global response to climate change.”67 Throughout 
this paper some of the intricacies and possible challenges technology transfer and 
energy innovation face have been discussed. This discussion needs to carry on and 
is necessary if we are to adequately address the multitude of problems that arise 
from climate change. The Paris agreement is correct in addressing the importance of 
these two strategies but needs to expand the discussion and examine the specific 
obstacles technology transfer and energy innovation face. Even though the Paris 
agreement is meant to be a somewhat broad policy document, more than a quick 
note of the importance of these strategies is needed. Due to the complexity of the 
climate change problem, policy articles focused on specific aspects of specific 
strategies are needed if any substantial and effective change is going to take place.  
Development in struggling nations and the capabilities of people living in these 
nations are key aspects of the climate change problem that need to be included in policy 
more often. This focus brings the significance of climate change justice to the forefront. 
Hopefully this paper showed that development and capabilities can be included into the 
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discussion without sacrificing anything in return. Emissions, future and present climate 
harms, development, capabilities, and cultural values can all be taken into account under 
a policy that prioritizes energy innovation and technology transfer. By adopting such an 
approach, the myriad of climate change related issues becomes more identifiable and 
manageable. While climate change is no doubt an enormous problem, in answering it we 
have the opportunity to create a more developed, freer, and more environmentally 
friendly global community.  
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